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Ul THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GEORGE PAPPAS, 
Defendant-Apoellant. 
CASE NO. 15567 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
The Apoellant, George Paooas, apoeals from a judgment 
of the District Court, Third Judicial District, the Honorable 
Hal C. Taylor, Judge, convicting the ApPellant of the crime of 
attempted theft by receiving. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
The Appellant was charged by information with the 
crime of attempted theft by receiving in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County. Jury trial was held on the 27th day of October, 
1977. Appellant was found guilty and uoon judgment, sentenced 
to be committed to the Utah State Prison. Appellant was 
released from the Utah State Prison in March, 1978 on bail 
Dending the appeal. 
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Relief Sought on Appeal 
Appellant submits the judgment of the Trial Court 
should be reversed, and the charge dismissed, or in the 
alternative, a new trial granted. 
Statement of Facts 
The Appellant was charged by information with the 
crime of attempted theft by receiving in violation of 76-6-AOB, 
u.C.A., 1953. ~~ich crime allegedly occurred on September 9, 
1976 (R. 6). It was alleged that the Appellant attempted to 
receive firearms which were the property of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department (R. 6). The Salt Lake City Police, through 
Officer Vuyk, contacted a prisoner awaiting prosecution who was 
detained in the Salt Lake County Jail (TR 11-14). The Police 
induced the prisoner, Rudy Sandoval, an admitted burglar 
(TR 42), to work undercover for the police. In exchange, they 
would speak to the County Attorney about the charges against 
Sandoval (TR 14). One charge pending against Sandoval was 
dropped, and for his work for the police, Sandoval was oaid 
$100.00. 
The police arranged for Sandoval's removal from the 
. 1 
Salt Lake County Ja1l. They gave him instructions on how to 
proceed and furnished him with a rented automobile (TR 16). 
The Police purchased a clock-radio from J. c. Penny Company 
which they also furnished to Sandoval. On September 8, 1976, 
1There is no showing in the record that the prisoner's 
release from jail was with judicial approval (TR 15). 
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the police "bugged" Mr. Sandoval's person and sent him to the 
Appellant's service station. Sandoval was accompanied by police 
who, with their electronic equipment, could overhear what 
was said by Sandoval and also hear sounds within his range 
(TR 16-17). At that time Sandoval allegedly told the Appellant, 
Pappas, that the property was stolen and that Sandoval was sick 
and needed money for drugs. A sale of the property was made 
(TR 19). The taped portion of that conversation was admitted 
as an exhibit (TR 6). 
Subsequently, on the 9th of September, 1976, the same 
action between the police and Sandoval was repeated. Firearms 
were obtained from the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
Training Division. Sandoval was taped and furnished a vehicle. 
He went to Pappas's service station where Sandoval allegedly 
sold two guns to Pappas. According to Sandoval, he told Pappas 
that the guns were stolen, that he, Sandoval, was a drug addict, 
sick and needed money (TR 38, 39, 42-43). 
A search warrant was issued, almost at the same time, 
by City Judge, Maurice Jones, who was in a police vehicle 
(TR 25), and the radio and guns were seized from the Appellant's 
service station. In addition, Sandoval testified about a prior 
sale of property to Pappas some three weeks before. The testimony 
intimated that he had sold property that may have been stolen, 
although Sandoval was unclear whether he said it was stolen 
(TR 35-36). 
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The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the AppellaM 
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
Argument 
POINT I 
The Trial Court Erred in Treating the 
Issue of EntraPment as Soley an Issue 
of Law for the-Court and in not Sub-
mitting the Matter of Entrapment to 
the Jury for Consideration. 
The facts disclose that the Salt Lake City Police 
took a prisoner fron the County Jail to act as an undercover 
operator, furnished him with guns that the undercover operative 
allegedly represented to be stolen, sent the operative to the 
Appellant's service station in a rented vehicle, paid the 
operative $100.00 for his work, and had the operative sell 
the guns to the Appellant. The operative represented to the 
Appellant as a narcontics addict and sick at the time and in 
need of money. Charges against the operative were dropped. 
The trial court, at the end of the prosecutor's 
case, denied the Appellant's motion to dismiss the charge on 
the grounds of entrapment, (TR 52). The trial court did not 
base the denial on any failure of Appellant to make a written 
pre-trial motion (TR 53). Subsequent to the denial of the 
motion, the prosecutor stated, (TR 54): 
MR. NIELSON: The state would have a 
m?tion in the nature of limiting this 
t~me, Your Honor, and it would be our 
position that inasmuch as the motion for 
entrapment has been denied, that counsel 
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for the defense should be instructed that 
no argument is proper with respect to that 
particular defense. 
THE COURT: Oh, I think that's 
correct. I don't think you can argue a 
defense that the court has denied. 
and (TR 55): 
THE COURT: That's the entrapment as 
a matter of law, and had I ruled in your 
favor on entrapment, there would have 
been no necessary issue to go to the 
jury. But because I have ruled against 
you, I don't think I am going to 
allow you to argue the effect of entrapment. 
The trial court and the prosecutor were apparently 
under the impression that entrapment, under Utah law, was 
purely an issue of law for the court. This would coincide 
with the so called "objective" theory of entrapment. This is the 
position taken by the Model Penal Code, §2.13(2) and in some 
states: State v. Mullen, 216 N.W. 2d 375 (Iowa 1974); People v. 
Turner, 390 Mich 7, 210 N.W. 2d 336 (1973). However, the 
majority of jurisdictions in the United States apply a "subjective" 
or "origin of intent" standard: Sorrells v. United States, 
287 U.S. 435 (1932); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 
(1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Hampton 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976). The position of this 
court has been that the proper test to apply is the origin of 
intent test, the subjective test, and not the objective standard: 
State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 369 P2d 494 (1962); State 
v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 326, 495 P2d 1265 (1972); State v. Curtis, 
542 P2d 744 (Utah 1975); State v. Hoffman, 558 P2d 602 (Utah 1976) · 
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under this standard, entrapment is a proper issue for the jury 
to consider. Possibly the trial court was of the mistaken 
opinion that the Utah Penal Code adopted the Model Penal 
Code position. However, such is not the case. 
76-2-303, U.C.A., 1953 provides for the defense of 
entrapment. The section provides for pre-trial notice of the 
defense and a hearing before the judge, and thereafter, consider-
ation is for the jury. 76-2-303(5), U.C.A., 1953 provides: 
Should the court determine that the 
defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss 
the case with prejudice, but if the court 
determines the defendant was not entrapped, 
such issue may be presented by the 
defendant to the jury at trial. 
The Utah statute specifies that the entrapment issue 
is for the jury if the court determines that entrapment has 
not been established as a matter of law: C.F. State v. Casias, 
567 P2d 1097 (Utah 1977); State v. Bridwell, 566 P2d 1232 
(Utah 1977). The issue is not for the court alone unless the 
court were to rule entrapment occurred as a matter of law; 
State v. Soroushien, 571 P2d 1370 (Utah 1977). The statute 
does not embody the objective standard. 
In State v. Sommers, 569 P2d 1110 (Utah 1977), 
under similar facts to those now before the court, it was 
stated that the entrapment issue was essentially for the 
trier of fact. See also, State v. Basham, 223 s.E. 2d 53 
(W.Va. 1976). 
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Since the trial court was under the mistaken belief 
that the entrapment issue was for the court's consideration 
alone, the trial court deprived the accused of the right to 
have his defense considered by the jury. This requires reversal 
and a new trial. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial 
Error in Admitting Evidence of Other 
Criminal Acts of the Appellant. 
The trial court admitted into evidence testimony 
relating to other criminal acts of the Appellant, other than 
that charged in the information. Appellant was charged with 
theft by receiving guns on September 9, 1976, believing that the 
guns probably had been stolen. The trial court received 
testimony as to a separate incident on September 8, 1976 
involving the receipt by Appellant of a clock-radio. This 
incident was not charged in the information. In addition, 
the testimony of Rudy Sandoval was that about three weeks to 
a month before the charged event, Sandoval and a friend, named 
Randy Alisando, took a CB radio and home unit to Pappas which 
the Appellant bought (TR 35-36). Sandoval's testimony was 
originally that Pappas was advised the items were stolen 
(TR 36), but then later retracted from that specific wording, 
but certainly left the impression that the item was stolen (TR 36) · 
The last incident was in no way related or connected to the 
incident in the information. 
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counsel for the Appellant, at a pre-trial hearing, 
had advised the trial judge the Appellant's defense would be 
entrapment (TR 53-54). Consequently, the only basis for admissio: 
of the prior criminal acts would be on the issue of entrapment. 
The Appellant did not claim mistake or lack of intent by knowledge 
Appellant did not take the stand. Rule 55, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, allows the admission into evidence of other crimes 
in a limited number of instances, when material to prove 
absence of mistake or accident, intent, knowledge, etc. The 
nature of this case was such that these matters were not material 
They were not in issue. The only issue was one of entrapment 
(TR 52). The exception under Rule 55, U.R.E., was not applicable 
Rule 55, U.R.E., otherwise provides: 
.. evidence that a person committed 
a crime or civil wrong on a specified 
occasion, is inadmissable to prove his 
disposition to commit crime ... as the 
basis for an inference that he committed 
another crime . . . on another specified 
occasion ... 
It is submitted, therefore, that the admission of 
such evidence was erroneous; State v. Ahrnes, 25 Utah 2d 222, 
478 P2d 786 (1971). 
Nor can it be validly contended that the evidence 
of other crimes was admissable on the issue of entrapment. 
Although prior decisions from this court have admitted evidence 
of other crimes to rebut claims of entrapment, State v. Perkins, 
l9 Utah 2d 421, 432 P2d 50 (1967), such cases have been negated 
as precedent by legislative action. When the Utah Penal Code 
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was adopted in 1973, 76-2-303(6), U.C.A., 1953, was adopted 
which provides: 
. . past offenses of the defendant 
shall not be admitted except that in a 
trial where the defendant testifies he 
may be asked of his past conviction for 
felonies . . . 
Consequently, where entrapment is in issue, evidence 
of other crimes may not be received to rebut an entrapment 
claim. Therefore, there was no legitimate basis to admit 
evidence of other crimes, and such evidence was obviously 
prejudicial, especially when the trial court took the entrap-
ment issue from the jury. 
Although trial defense counsel did not object to the 
evidence, the admission was plain error; State v. Poe, 21 
Utah 2d 113, 441 P2d 512 (1968). 
POINT III 
Reversable Error was Committed in 
the Prosecution's Opening Argument. 
The prosecutor, during his opening argument made 
reference to matters outside of the evidence which was to be 
presented. These remarks could only have set the jurors' minds 
against the Appellant. The opening argument of the prosecutor 
had the effect of suggesting to the jury that the Appellant 
was engaged in a continuing enterprise of dealing in stolen 
porperty with theives and burglars. The prosecutor stated, 
and counsel objected: 
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MR. NIELSON: A person who receives 
stolen or hot property is sometimes refer-
red to as a fence or a criminal receiver. 
Those terms will be referred to probably 
with considerable frequency during the 
trial today. There is no question in 
law enforcement experience that the 
activities of thieves and burglars and 
so on are supported in large measure by 
the stable and continuing market for 
stolen property. 
MR. BRIDWELL: Your Honor, I again 
object to this as properly argument and 
not part of an opening statement. 
MR. NIELSON: Your Honor, again I 
think it's important that this jury under-
sca~d before we get to the evidence 
wha~ k1nd of a crime it is we are talking 
about today. 
THE COURT: You tell them what the 
evidence will show, and I will tell them 
what the crime is. (TR 6). 
The statement of counsel was beyond the evidence to be 
presented and in the nature of argument. It characterized the 
Appellant as a person engaged in general criminal enterprise. 
It included matters not involved in the case. Later in the 
same opening statement, the court was required, again, to 
stop counsel, on objection, from speculating about police 
procedures in dealing with crimes in theft by receiving (T!< 7, 8). 
The effect of counsel's statement was to obviously 
suggest to the jury that Appellant was a professional "fence". 
Thus, the Appellant's right to be presumed innocent until the 
evidence established his guilt was undermined. In Wharton's 
Criminal Procedure (12th Ed. Torcia) Volume 3 §493, it observed 
as to the prosecutor's opening statement: 
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Prior to presenting evidence, the 
prosecutor may make an opening statement. 
In such a statement, the prosecutor 
explains the nature of the charge, out-
lines succintly the supportive evidence 
which he expects to prove, and identifies 
the issues. Basically, the purpose of the 
opening statement is to program the jurors 
so that they can follow and understand the 
evidence as it unfolds during the trial. 
It is not the office of an opening state-
ment to argue the merits of the case, to 
discuss the pertinent law, to recite the 
anticipated testimony, or other evidence 
at length and in detail, to advert to a 
confession or other inculpatory statement 
of the defendant. 
In State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 425, 120 P2d 285 
(1941) this court stated with reference to opening statements: 
The purpose of an opening statement 
is to advise the jury of the facts relied 
upon and of the questions and issues 
involved, which the jury will have to 
determine, and to give them a general 
picture of the facts and the situations, 
so that they will be able to understand 
the evidence. Counsel should outline 
generally what he intends to prove, 
and should be allowed considerable 
latitude. He should make a fair statement 
of the evidence, and the extent to which 
he may go is largely in the discretion of 
the trial court. He should not make a 
statement of any facts which he cannot 
legally prove upon the trial; nor should 
he argue the merits of his case or relate 
the testimony at length. See 64 C.J. 235, 
Sec. 251; State v. Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 
262 P. 113; People v. Reed, 333 Ill. 397 
164 N.E. 847; Green v. State, 172 Ga. 
635 158 S.E. 285. The District Attorney 
went way beyond what was proper, in 
reciting verbatim the conversations which 
he intended to prove, and in giving the 
details of his evidence. The opening 
statement should be a brief outline of the 
evidence, and not a recital at length of 
what he intends to prove. It was clearly 
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misconduct on his part, to recite conver-
sations which were hearsay and incompetent 
as evidence. And it was improper for him 
to overstate the conversations which were 
admissable in evidence. 
In Erwin, the court held no prejudice resulted because 
of the court's instructions. In this instant case at the time 
of presentation of the prosecution's opening argument, the 
court gave no instructions to the jury limiting the effect 
of the statement, nor did the court admonish the jury to dis-
regard the improper references. The opening statement, when 
coupled with the evidence of other criminal activities not 
charged, clearl~ preJudiced the Appellant. 
POINT IV 
The Trial Court Erred in Admitting 
Into Evidence Taped Conversations Allegedly 
between the State's Undercover Agent and 
the Appellant Because: (1) The Foundation 
for Admission was Insufficient, (2) The 
Tape Contained Other Material Not Relevant 
to the Case, and (3) No Transcript of the 
Tape Was Made for Appellate Review. 
The trial judge admitted into evidence, over objection 
of Appellant's counsel (TR 48), tape recorded conversations 
between the State's informant and the Appellant. The tape 
recording was played for the jury, and apparently admitted 
as an Exhibit, (Exh. 6). The tape recording consisted of the 
conversation between Appellant, Pappas, and the police operative, 
Rudy Dale Sandoval, on September 8 and Se?tember 9, 1976, 
involving the sale of a clock-radio on the 8th and guns on the 
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9th. Only the incident on the 9th of September, 1976 was 
charged. Counsel for the Appellant objected that there was 
no foundation for admission of the tape (TR 48). No transcript 
of the tape was made at the time the tape was played for the 
jury. In addition to the conversations between Pappas and 
Sandoval, the tape contained other wholly extraneous information 
(TR 56). The record is not clear whether the jury had the 
tape during their deliberation, although they did not have a 
recorder (TR 56). 
The foundation for the admissibility of the tape was 
established through the testimony of Officer John Stoner 
(TR 45-48). He testified to placing a body bug on the agent, 
"for the purpose of sending him to various areas" to sell 
supposedly stolen property (TR 45). He testified that he 
accompanied the other officers to several locations (TR 45). 
Stoner accompanied the other officers and the operative in order 
to operate the electronic equipment (TR 46). He listened to 
and taped the conversations. He testified that he subsequently 
listened to the tapes and that they accurately reflected 
what he heard at the time (R. 47). No other foundation was 
laid. 
Before a tape recording may be received in evidence, 
it must be authenticated. Rule 67, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
provides: 
Authentication of a writing is required 
before it may be received in evidence. 
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A writing under the Utah Rules of Evidence is defined in Rule 
1 (12): 
writing means . . every other means 
of recording upon an tangible thing any 
form of communication or representation, 
including ... sounds . 
Therefore, a tape recording is a writing requiring 
authentication. Rule 67, U.R.E. also provides: 
Authentication may be by evidence 
sufficient to sustain a finding of its 
authenticity or by any other means provided 
by law. 
Consequently, the Utah Rules of Evidence provide for no specific 
and detailed me~hod of authentication. Cases from other 
jurisdictions have addressed the standard for authentication 
of tape recordings. 
In United States v. McKeever, 169 F. Supp. 426 
(SDNY 1958), the trial court refused admission of a tape 
recording of a conversation offered by the defense. The 
conversation was supposedly with the prosecution's key witness. 
The foundation laid for the admissibility of the recording was 
similar to that before the trial court in the instant case. 
The authenticating witness recognized the defendant's voice 
and another person's voice, recalled the conversation, and the 
place of the conversation. Holding the foundation inadequate 
for admission, the court laid seven criteria for admission: 
A review of the authorities leads to 
the conclusion that, before a sound recording 
is admitted into evidence, a foundation 
must be established by showing the following 
facts: 
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1. That the operator of the device 
was capable of taking the conversation 
now offered in evidence. 
2. That the operator of the device 
was competent to operate the device. 
3. That the recording is authentic 
and correct. 
4. That changes, additions, or 
deletions have not been made in the 
recording. 
5. That the recording has been 
preserved in a manner that is shown to the 
court. 
6. That the speakers are identified. 
7. That the conversation elicited 
was made voluntarily and in good faith, 
without any kind of inducement. 
An examination of the foundation testimony given in 
the instant case shows a critical failure to meet the foundation 
requirements for admission. Especially critical is the failure 
to identify the speakers as was requested by defense counsel. 
No foundation on voluntariness was laid. The absence of 
additions and deletions was not accounted for. Indeed, the 
tape contains other conversations than those relevant to the 
instant case. No foundation as to the accuracy of the recording 
device or its operation was before the court. 
Identification of the alleged speakers is critical 
to the authentication of taped evidence of an undercover 
police operation. Especially this is so when a criminal 
operative is being used who has a great deal to gain from 
getting what the police and the operative may hope for and 
where others may be present. In United States v. Sansone, 
231 F2d 887 (2nd Cr. 1956), the court observed: 
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When a portable transmitting and 
receiving set, or other device is used to 
overhear conversations, the initial 
qualification for admission of evidence 
involves two sets of interelated problems: 
First, whether the device used is an 
effective means of communicating sound, 
and Second, the identification of the 
alleged speaker. P. 890. 
Neither foundational prerequisite was adequately 
established in this case. In Sansone, the court went on to 
observe concerning the foundations for bugging devices: 
Such evidence, however, should be 
treated with considerably greater caution 
than evidence arising from telephone 
conversations, due to much greater familiarity 
of the general public with the character-
istics and potentialities of the telephone. 
In annotation, Admissibility of Sound Recordings 
in Evidence, 58 ALR2d 1024, 32, it is observed: 
. and generally it may be said, 
the cases indicate a strict adherence to 
the rules for testing the admissibility 
of recordings. 
It is, therefore, submitted that reversable error 
was committed in receiving the tape recording (Exh. 6) without 
proper foundation. 
Second, it is submitted this court should revers0 
because no transcript of the recording was made and other 
matter was on the tape. Recently, in Peoole v. Caston, 573 P2d 
423 Cal. (1978), the California Supreme Court had a similar 
issue before it. The court noted Appellant's counsel had 
stipulated a stenographic record of the transcription did not 
have to be made, a situation unlike that in the instant case. 
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It is also noted that a tape recording during the trial was 
part of the oral proceedings and should be included as part 
of the normal record. It is submitted that the failure of the 
trial court to cause a transcript of the tape to be made is 
an additional reason for reversal. 
POINT V 
The Trial court Improperly Instructed 
The Jury on the Elements of the Charge 
Against the Appellant. 
The information in the instant case charged the 
Appellant with attempted theft by receiving (R.6). The 
specific allegation against the Appellant was an attempt to 
"receive stolen property, to wit: firearms .. The sale 
conduct alleged against the Appellant was the act of receiving. 
76-6-408(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 defines "receives" 
as "acquiring possession, control, or title, or lending on the 
security of property." 76-6-408(1), Utah Code Annotated provides 
several methods of violation of that section of the code. 
The offense may be committed by: (a) receiving, (b) retaining, 
(c) disposing, (d) concealing, (e) selling, or (f) witholding. 
The Appellant was charged only with receiving. None of the 
other possible violations of 76-6-408(1) U.C.A. 1953 were 
alleged. 
Instruction number ll given by the court advised the 
jury that the Defendant could be convicted if he "received or 
retained" property believing it to be stolen (TR 40). A 
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similar instruction was given in instruction 12 (TR 41). 
Thus, the instructions given by the court allowed the jury to 
find the Appellant guilty on a definition of the crime not 
charged in the information. The instructions went beyond the 
offense charged and encompassed conduct of a different nature 
than that alleged. 
In State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113, 170 P2d 153 
(1946), this court states: 
We have repeatedly criticized the 
giving of abstract statements of the law 
to the jury, and heed that it is the duty 
of the court to apply the law to the facts 
supported by the evidence and to not 
instruct on any question which is not 
involved in the case under the evidence 
(citing numerous Utah cases). 
. . . l~e think that it cannot be too 
strongly emphasized that the court should 
apply the law to the facts as they appear 
from the evidence, and should instruct 
only on the law which has a bearing on 
facts ... (110 Utah 101) 
In State v. Anselmo, 558 P2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 1977), 
this court observed: 
Ordinarily it is error to instruct 
on abstract principles of law that are 
not applicable to the facts before the 
jury . 
In the instant case, the instructions exceeded the 
charge and the evidence. If accepted by the jury, the 
instructions given could have authorized the jury to find the 
Appellant guilty on a charge different than that contained 
in the information. The evidence and the prosecution's theory 
of the case was based on attempted receipt of property believed 
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to have been stolen. The question of retaining property was not 
before the trial court. However, the jury could have believed 
that the defendant's guilt was made out if he retained rather 
than received the property, believing it to have been stolen. 
Thus, the instructions given were confusing, misleading, and 
erroneous. Prejudicial error was committed. 
POINT VI 
Title 76, Chapter 6, Setion 408, 
U.C.A., 1953, as Interpreted and Applied 
In this Case Violates Article 1, §7 of 
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and 
the XIVth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States. 
In State V. Sommers, 539 P2d 1110 (Utah 1977), this 
court ruled that a conviction for attempted theft by receiving 
can be sustained by the receipt of property by a defendant 
believing the property to have been stolen when in fact the 
property was not stolen. This court sustained the constitution 
ality of section 76-4-101(3) (6), U.C.A., 1953 eliminating the 
defense of legal or factual impossibility. Thus, the construction 
the court left as to 76-6-408, U.C.A., 1953 on theft by receiving 
was that the mere receipt of property by a person believing the 
property probably to be stolen would suffice to convict. The 
Appellant submits that this construction of 76-6-408, U.C.A., 
1953 violates the "due process" clause of Article 1 §7 of the 
Constitution of Utah, especially as applied in this case. 
This issue was not passed on in Sommers. 
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The Appellant, Pappas, received property that had 
never been the subject of theft or wrongful appropriation. 
No person suffered any loss, nor was the public health, safety, 
and welfare threatened by Pappas act. If any injury occurred to 
the public fisk, it was from the use of public funds to buy 
an uneeded clock-radio, rent an automobile for two days, and 
pay a burglar who was released from jail on two occassions, 
apparently without approval of the committing judicial official. 
The property involved, which was allegedly stolen, but not in ht 
was tendered to the Appellant by a police agent with full urgi~ 
and allowance by police officers. To allow Pappas to be convictt 
and sentenced to prison under such circumstances denies due 
process of law. The statute as construed and applied allowed 
Pappas to be committed for an act not itself injurious in any 
fashion. The evidence, if any, is simply Pappas's thinking the 
property was stolen because the police deliberately lied to 
him. Consequently it is submitted that the statute as applied 
in this case is unconstitutional. The State's legislative 
power must be exercised to promote health, comfort, safety, 
good morals, and general welfare. State ex. rel. Cox v. Board 
of Education, 21 Utah 401, 60 Pac. 1013 (1900). The mere 
legislative declaration that an act is within its police power 
does not, in fact, make it so. Utah Manufacturers' Assn. v. 
Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P2d 229 (1933). Recently in Peck v. 
Dunn, 574 P2d 367 (Utah 1978), this court observed as to the 
legislative authority: 
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It is elementary that the governing 
authority in the exercise of its police 
power has both the perrogative and the 
responsibility of enacting laws which will 
promote and conserve the health, safety, 
morals, and general welfare of society. 
Within this standard, it is well settled that the 
criminal law may not be used to punish thinking about crime; 
Burdick. Law of Crime, Vol I §98; Rex v. Sutton, 1 East, 
Pleas of the Crown 172, 93 Eng. Rep. 1040 (1736): "It is 
certain that a bare intention is not punishable . 
Republican v. Malin, 1 Dall. (U.S.) 33, 11th Ed. 25. 
In Holmes, The Common Law, p. 67, it was stated: 
The reason for punishing any act 
must generally be to prevent some harm 
which is foreseen as likely to follow that 
act under the circumstances in which it 
is done. In most substantive crimes, the 
ground on which that likelihood stands is 
the common working of natural causes as 
shown by experience. But when an act is 
punished the natural effect of which is 
not harmful under the circumstances, that 
ground alone will not suffice. 
Therefore, the criminal law may not be used to punish 
evil thoughts without some act of significance to the health, 
safety, morals, and welfare. 
In People v. Johnson, 564, P2d 116 (Colo. 1977), 
the Colorado Supreme Court considered the constitutionality 
of the Colorado receiving statute which was similar to the 
Utah statute as construed. The court held that the statute 
was unconstitutional on grounds other than now being discussed, 
but observed: 
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We do not have a situation in which 
the property was not in fact stolen. 
Therefore, we do not reach the question 
of constitutionality of a conviction of a 
defendant who believes unstolen property 
was stolen. 
Here the issue is presented. It is submitted that 
under facts of this case, no harm to the health, safety, and 
welfare of the citizenry being shown, the conviction cannot 
stand in the face of Article I §7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Federal cases have also recognized the constitutional 
limitations on prosecution for mere intent with in innocuous 
act. The United States Supreme Court has narrowly construed 
Congressional efforts to regulate conduct that may involve 
criminal regulation of a state of mind. Yates v. United States, 
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Seales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 
(1960); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). There are 
limitations imposed by the due process clause of the XIVth 
Amendment on the exercise of legislative authority. Cleveland 
Bd. of Education v. La Fluer, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Thus, 
a California ordinance that made it criminal for a felon to 
be in a city without registering was ruled in violation of the 
XIVth Amendment. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); 
see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), un-
constitutional to punish being addicted. Under a similar 
consideration of the limitations on the legislative authority, 
76-6-408' U .C .A., 1953, as construed and applied is unconstitutior: 
In addition, Appellant contends 76-6-408, 1953 is 
unconstitutional because it is overly broad and violates due 
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process by making criminal a state of mind that merely requires 
"believing that (property) probably has been stolen". In State 
v. Mullins, 549 P2d 454 (Utah 1976), this court upheld, in the 
face of a constitution challenge, the presumption relating 
to knowledge of stolen property contained in 76-6-408(1) 
U.C.A., 1953. In State v. Plum, 552 P2d 124 (Utah 1976), this 
court held the mental state required in the state was not 
unconstitutional because of vagueness. However, neither of the 
two cases cited considered whether the statute violated due 
process by being overly broad in scope. 
In People v. Johnson, 564 P2d 116 (Colo. 1977), the 
Colorado Supreme Court considered a challenge to similar but 
less specific language in the Colorado Statute dealing with the 
mental responsibility for theft by receiving--"reasonable cause 
to believe. The Colorado Supreme Court held the statute 
unconstitutional. The court stated: 
We hold that that portion of the 
statute defining the mental state as 
including "having reasonable cause to 
believe" is unconstitutional by reason 
of overbreadth. In order for a statute 
such as this to be constitutional, there 
must be a knowledge or belief by the 
defendant that the goods were stolen. 
There is a constitutional proscription 
against conviction of a defendant charged 
with felony by theft if it is predicated 
upon his negligence or his failure to 
exercise the intelligence of an ordinary, 
prudent man. The standard of culpability, 
in order to be constitutional, must be 
what the state of mind of the particular 
defendant was, not what a jury concludes 
might be that of a fictional reasonably 
prudent man. 
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This court should reverse and dismiss because 
76-6-408, U.C.A., 1953 violates Article I §7 of the Constitution 
of Utah and the XIVth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully submits this court should 
reverse. The trial court's failure to submit the issue of 
entrapment to the jury was based on an erroneous conclusion as 
to the defense of entrapment under Utah law. The court also 
erred in receiving evidence of other criminal acts or wrongs 
of the Appellant, Pappas. Prejudicial error was committed 
in the prosecutor's opening statement. In addition, the court 
improperly admitted critical evidence without proper foundation 
and under circumstances that prevented its fair consideration 
at trial or on appeal. The instructions given by the court 
also constituted prejudicial error. Finally, the statute 
under which the Appellant was convicted as interpreted and applied 
in this case, is unconstitutional. This case should be 
reversed and dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted 
DEAN R. MITCHELL I 
AUorney for Defendant-Appell'"ll 
I 
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